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Highlights 
 Both sexes display inaccuracies in estimating their labour market prospects, but in 
different directions. 
 Overestimation of labour market prospects prior to employment is associated with 
lower subsequent employment satisfaction. 
 Female underestimation and male overestimation of labour market prospects explains 
a significant proportion of the paradox of the contented female worker.  
 
Abstract 
Both sexes display inaccuracies in estimating their labour market prospects, but in different 
directions. Consistent with the literature on sex differences in psychological bias, females are 
less optimistic than men and on average tend to be overly pessimistic.  Optimism, measured 
as an upwardly biased perception of the labour market returns distribution, increases the 
likelihood of disappointment with realized performance. A substantial proportion of the 
female job satisfaction advantage appears to be associated with both overly pessimistic 
female expectations and overly optimistic male expectations. The implications of female 
pessimism on both job-search and gender earnings differentials is also discussed.   
 
JEL Classification Codes: D84, J28, J64 
Keywords: Optimism, wage expectations, job satisfaction 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One of the most robust findings within economics and related disciplines is the existence of 
the pay gap between men and women (Blau and Kahn, 2000). Despite being paid less, 
especially at the top end of the wage distribution (Arulampalam et al., 2007) women are more 
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satisfied with their work and with their pay (Clark, 1997; Bender et al., 2005), with this 
anomaly being termed “the paradox of the contented female worker” (Crosby, 1982). The 
most prominent explanation of this paradox is not that women have jobs which are 
unobservedly better than men, but that, women have lower reward expectations than men and 
as such, are more easily satisfied with any given employment outcome (Clark, 1997).  
 
Lower female labour market expectations may be the result of two possible mechanisms. 
Firstly lower female expectations may in themselves be justified, in that; they accurately 
reflect gender heterogeneity in the distribution of market wages offered, owing to factors 
such as labour market discrimination (Altonji and Black, 1999; Bertrand, 2011). 
Alternatively, lower female expectations may stem from underlying gender differences in 
psychological systematic bias (Kahneman et al., 1982). The focus of this paper is on 
optimism, or more specifically, female pessimism. While under rational expectations, agents’ 
predictions are a mirror reflection of the distribution of market wages offered, this requires 
that workers possess accurate information concerning their attributes. This is problematic, as 
practically everyone overestimates their own ability (Weinstein, 1980). Camerer and Lovallo 
(1999) note two interesting exceptions to this general rule. First, the clinically depressed do 
not have optimistic expectations concerning their own competence (Alloy and Ahrens, 1987). 
Second, women are less optimistic than men and for certain traits are found to be overly 
pessimistic (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974). As Arabsheibani et al. (2000) note, higher male 
optimism is consistent with theories from evolutionary psychology. For women, men’s 
commitment and earning capacity is a key sorting variable in mating competition, while men 
attach a greater weight to physical attractiveness (Buss, 1989; Fisman et al., 2006). To 
increase their chances of success, men are motivated to increase their earnings or to signal 
their opportunities for future prosperity (Cole et al., 1992). The best way to convince others 
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of your future prosperity is to really believe it yourself (Trivers, 2000), suggesting that self-
deception may have evolutionary advantages for men.  
 
Using data from a major UK longitudinal survey, the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), the principal aim of this paper is to investigate the extent to which lower female 
earnings expectations amongst the unemployed and economically inactive can be explained 
by either systematic female underestimation/male overestimation or heterogeneous labour 
market prospects. Within this study, optimism is measured for individuals prior to entry into 
the employee labour market and is defined empirically as the miscalibration between an 
individual’s actual recorded wage expectation and their predicted market wage. This measure 
conforms to the formal definition of optimism used in economics whereby there is a 
systematic biased belief in the probability of favourable outcomes (Hey, 1984). This view of 
optimism is closely related to the psychology literature concerning unrealistic optimism 
(Weinstein, 1980)—where individuals overestimate the probability that a favourable outcome 
will occur, or underestimate the probability that a negative outcome will occur—and to the 
form of overconfidence which Moore and Healy (2008) categorize as overestimation—where 
there are miscalibrated beliefs in one’s ability or performance. These measures of optimism 
are though distinct from the dispositional optimism perspective.  Optimism is not viewed here 
as a biased perception about the probability of a future event occurring, but as a generalized 
outcome expectancy that good things will happen (Scheier et al., 1994). 
 
Secondly, the empirical analysis seeks to determine the effect of optimism on subsequent 
employee job satisfaction and importantly whether gender differences in optimism can help 
to explain the paradox of the contented female worker. The economics literature has tended 
to focus on the negative aspects of optimism, in that, optimism, like any form of judgemental 
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bias,  must lead to sub-optimal decision making and consequently lower utility (Puri and 
Robinson, 2007). One noticeable exception to this is Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), who 
argue that optimistic thinking allows individuals to take instantaneous gratification in their 
future success. Forward looking agents will therefore choose to be optimistic as the 
anticipatory utility from holding optimistic beliefs will tend to outweigh the costs of distorted 
decision making. Still, optimists have a tendency to overestimate the likelihood of positive 
outcomes, and in the context of this study, to overestimate their prospects in paid-
employment. A consequence, is that on average, actual realized returns will tend to fall short 
of expectations, negatively influencing satisfaction through what psychologists have referred 
to as self-discrepancy (Higgins, 1987) and disappointment (Bell, 1985).  
 
Whilst previous studies have already analysed the link between expectations and the female 
job satisfaction advantage (e.g. Clark, 1997), owing to the lack of data collected on wage 
expectations these studies have been constrained to using statistically derived measures, 
usually computed as the fitted values from a Mincer equation. Wage expectations are 
therefore assumed to be fully rational, in that, individuals construct their expectations by 
observing the labour market rewards of other people like themselves. Actual recorded 
earnings expectations and the psychological bias in these forecasts are the focus of this paper, 
rational expectations are not. This is important, if lower female expectations can be explained 
solely by heterogeneous labour market prospects, a narrowing gender pay gap will help 
eliminate the gender expectation gap. However, if lower female expectations also result from 
underlying gender differences in systematic psychological bias, then even in labour markets 
with no discrimination, lower female expectations are likely to persist. In short, if females are 
more predisposed to underestimating their prospects than men, they will continue to be 
satisfied with lower compensation which is of serious concern for policy measures attempting 
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to uncover ways to reduce the gender wage gap. The implications of female pessimism/male 
optimism on the gender pay gap are discussed in detail within the conclusion.   
 
  
2. Background and theory 
Extant empirical research has sought to determine the underlying influences on individual job 
satisfaction, as job satisfaction is an important factor in the determination of various key 
aspects of employee behaviour. Most noticeably for the economics discourse are the array of 
studies that have shown the significance of job satisfaction in determining quitting behaviour, 
productivity and absenteeism (Akerlof et al., 1988; Clark, 2001; Judge et al., 2001; Clark et 
al., 2012).  These studies generally rely on Likert type responses to the individual’s 
subjective perception about job satisfaction. Job satisfaction measures can be quite 
informative in this respect as they capture the workers’ reaction towards the array of 
characteristics associated with employment (Hamermesh, 2001).  
 
Despite women on average being paid significantly less than men (Blau and Kahn, 2000) and 
having by many yardsticks objectively worse jobs (Heywood, 1989) there is wide evidence 
that women are more satisfied with their work and wages (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Clark, 
1997; Sloane and Williams, 2000; Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2000; Bender et al., 2005). 
One of the most prominent explanations of the gender/job‐satisfaction paradox is that women 
have lower reward expectations than men, and as such, are more easily satisfied (Clark, 
1997).  This theoretical viewpoint is closely related to the models of pay satisfaction 
developed using self-discrepancy theory from social psychology. Here, individuals are 
consumed by a number of negative emotions, such as dissatisfaction and disappointment, 
when their realized state is lower than their expected state (Katzell, 1964; Porter and Lawler, 
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1968; Locke, 1969; Lawler, 1971; Bell, 1985; Higgins, 1987). The satisfaction we derive 
from outcomes is therefore based to some extent on counterfactual thinking—favourable 
outcomes are more attractive when they are unexpected, and unfavourable outcomes feel less 
disappointing when they are expected (Mellers et al., 1997). Thus, receiving £10 when 
expecting £5 feels pleasing; receiving £10 when expecting £100 feels disappointing. Wage 
expectations are likely to be formed from a mix of social comparisons, prior labour market 
experiences, by what the individual thinks they deserve or by what is considered equitable. 
Owing to heterogeneous expectations, individuals who receive the same amount of 
remuneration from employment can therefore differ substantially in their pay satisfaction 
levels. In the spirit of Clark (1997), consider an individual’s job satisfaction (ܬܵ) from paid-
employment for those moving from unemployment,	ܷ, into paid-employment, ܧ, in period ݐ:  
  
ܬ ௜ܵ௧ா ൌ ݂ሺݕ௜௧ா , ܧ௜௧ିଵ௎ , ݅௜௧ா , ݆௜௧ா ሻ (1) 
 
where	ݕ௜௧ா  is the employees obtained income,	݅௜௧ா 	and ݆௜௧ா 	are the employees individual and job-
specific characteristics and  ܧ௜௧ିଵ௎  represents an individual’s actual recorded performance 
expectation prior to becoming an employee. In Equation (1), ܧ௜௧ିଵ௎ 	and ݕ௜௧ா   are assumed to be 
positively correlated, in the sense that higher expectations are in some respects rational and 
will lead to higher performance outcomes. However, the higher these expectations are the 
more likely it is that they go unfulfilled (Adams, 1965; Proto and Rustichini, 2015).  
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While earnings expectations have been shown to be in the main qualitatively rational and an 
accurate estimate of realised earnings (Major et al., 1984; Betts, 1996; Dominitz and Manski, 
1996; Webbink and Hartog, 2004), under rational expectations ܧ௜௧ିଵ௎ ൌ ݕ௜௧ா 	 and any 
inconsistencies must reflect bad ‘luck’ or a bad ‘match’ in a job with less preferable pay than 
available elsewhere, which may impart a sense of regret (Bell, 1982). Alternatively 
forecasting errors may result from systematic bias as a large body of psychological research 
suggests. De Bondt and Thaler (1995) suggest that optimism is one of the most pervasive 
human traits, in that, almost everyone overestimates their ability. Prior research has found 
substantial gender heterogeneity across a range of personality traits, including risk taking 
(Byrnes et al., 1999; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), locus of control 
(Semykina and Linz, 2007) and components of the Big 5 personality scale (Mueller and Plug, 
2006). In the context of optimism, whilst studies have shown that the majority of individuals 
overestimate their own abilities and are unrealistically optimistic about their future (e.g., 
Weinstein, 1980; Taylor and Brown, 1988; Waldman, 1994), evidence also suggests that 
under many conditions men are more unrealistically optimistic than women (Maccoby and 
Jacklin, 1974); including in their expectations about a happy marriage (Lin and Raghubir, 
2005) and traffic accident risk perception (DeJoy, 1992). Frieze et al. (1978) and Waldman 
(1994) discuss the systematic overestimation of abilities by men but also importantly the 
underestimation of females, suggesting that both sexes are inaccurate in estimating their 
abilities but in different directions.  In order to pinpoint the extent to which forecast errors 
reflect systematic psychological bias, Equation (1) can be modified as follows:  
 
ܬ ௜ܵ௧ா ൌ ݂ሺݕ௜௧ா , ܧ௜௧ିଵ௎ െ ݕො௜௧ିଵ௎ , ݅௜௧ா , ݆௜௧ா ሻ (2) 
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where ݕො௜௧ିଵ௎   is a predicted market wage, which represents the realistic probability of an 
individual’s labour market performance or  a “going rate” based upon the average income of 
people with the same individual characteristics as the respondent. Importantly, the predicted 
market wages are derived within sex, under the assumption that expectations are narrowly 
drawn (Major and Forcey, 1985; Sloane and Williams, 2000). Optimism is therefore defined 
as ܧ௜௧ିଵ௎ െ ݕො௜௧ିଵ௎ 	, which is the difference between the realistic probabilities of an individual’s 
labour market prospects given his/her various characteristics and the individuals wage 
expectations. Optimistic thinking widens the scope for disappointment by increasing ones 
vulnerability to self-discrepancies between expected and experienced outcomes.  
 
Based on the theoretical framework outlined above, this paper proposes the following 
hypothesis, tested in the following empirical analysis.  
 
Hypothesis 1. Females have on average less optimistic wage expectations than men. This 
hypothesis is tested on the basis of a smaller or more negative ܧ௜௧ିଵ௎ െ ݕො௜௧ିଵ௎  for the female 
group. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Overly optimistic wage expectations are associated with lower levels of 
subsequent paid-employment job satisfaction. This is tested on the basis of a negative 
coefficient between ܧ௜௧ିଵ௎ െ ݕො௜௧ିଵ௎  and ܬ ௜ܵ௧ா , conditional on ݕ௜௧ா , ݅௜௧ா  and ݆௜௧ா .  
 
Hypothesis 3. Lower female optimism contributes to explaining the paradox of the contented 
female worker, ܬഥܵ ி ൐ ܬഥܵ ெ. 
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3. Data source and descriptive analysis 
The data used for the empirical analysis are drawn from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS). This is a nationally representative general purpose household survey of 5,000 
households (comprising approximately 12,000 individuals). Households are re-interviewed 
annually and the present analysis uses the 18 annual waves available between 1991 and 2008. 
The sample used for the subsequent analysis is restricted to the original BHPS sample 
covering Great Britain and to employees; the unemployed and the economically inactive who 
are below the state pension age (16-59 for women, 16-64 for men).  
 
Within the BHPS if the respondent ‘is not currently working but has looked for work or has 
not looked for work in last four weeks but would like a job’, he/she is asked: ‘About how 
many hours in a week do you think you would be able to work?’ Individuals are then asked 
about expected wages: ‘What weekly take-home pay would you expect to get (for that)?’ From 
these responses, an hourly expected wage (£’s) is constructed, ܧ௜௧௎, for individuals who are 
currently classified as unemployed or economically inactive, ܷ, but who subsequently 
become employees later in the panel.1    Given the reference to ‘take home pay’ and following 
Brown and Taylor (2011, 2013) it is assumed that responses refer to the net expected wage. 
Consequently, all further analysis focuses on net hourly pay (£’s).  The economically inactive 
are included in the sample if they report an expected wage as this is interpreted as a signal of 
labour market attachment. In order to determine whether these wage expectations are 
biased—in that they do not adequately reflect the distribution of market wages offered—a 
predicted market wage is constructed, ݕො௜௧௎, for the sample of unemployed and economically 
                                                            
1 Approximately 39% of the sample are unemployed with the remainder being classified as economically 
inactive. Major inactive groups are those in family care, those that are full-time students and those classified as 
long-term sick/disabled. To deal with multiple transitions out of inactivity/unemployment and into employment 
per individual, the analysis focuses only on the first observable transition to ensure that expectations are 
constructed for individuals prior to entry into paid-employment. 
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inactive individuals, ܷ.   The predicted market wage or “going rate” is constructed following 
Prasad (2003), Hogan (2004) and Brown and Taylor (2011; 2013) by estimating a pooled 
OLS log of net hourly earnings equation on all employees in the dataset who have one or less 
than one year of current job tenure. Net hourly wages are assumed to be determined by the 
following vector of characteristics: age in quadratic form, education, ethnicity, marital status, 
physical and mental health, region of residence and year.2 The wage equation is formally 
shown in Equation (3), where ݕ௜௧ா  is the net hourly wages of employees, ܧ. ௜ܺ௧ா is a vector of 
employee characteristics and ݒ௜௧ is the usual random error term.   
 
log	ሺݕሻ௜௧ா ൌ ߩᇱ ௜ܺ௧ா ൅ ݒ௜௧  (3)   
log	ሺݕොሻ௜௧௎ ൌ log	ሺݕොሻ௜௧ ൌ ߩොᇱ ௜ܺ௧௎ 
 
The estimated coefficients ߩො are then used to predict the market wage for our group of 
unemployed or economically inactive individuals,	ܷ, based upon their vector of 
characteristics,	 ௜ܺ௧௎, such that ௜ܺ௧௎ ൌ ௜ܺ௧ா. Importantly, the predicted market wage is computed 
from separate gender earnings equations as social comparisons tend to be same-sex (Major 
and Forcey, 1985; Sloane and Williams, 2000) and hence to allow for the fact that men and 
women may be rewarded differently for their individual specific characteristics. This in turn 
eliminates the possibility that lower female expectations result from contemporary female 
disadvantages experienced in the labour market or additionally issues surrounding men and 
women selecting different career paths. This gives a total of 7,298 observations (3,742 female 
                                                            
2 Sample selection into employment is controlled for by including an inverse mills ratio in the wage equations 
where the over-identifying instruments are whether the respondent has any dependent children and whether the 
respondent’s partner is employed. The presence of dependent children may force some individuals to retreat 
from the labour market to care for their children whereas others might find the costs of rearing children 
increases the likelihood of finding employment. In the same view, partner’s employment status is also likely to 
influence the likelihood of employment due to gains from specialization between housework and paid work.  
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and 3,556 male observations) from 4,077 individuals from whom information on both the 
expected wages and predicted market wages are available.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the kernel probability density function of the log expected wage and log 
predicted market wage for the male and female samples. 
The first panel in Figure 1 displays the log net expected wages for the male and female 
samples. Males tend to have higher wage expectations than females. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test is conducted to test for the equality of the log expected wage distributions between 
genders, confirming the difference at the 1% level of statistical significance.   To begin to 
uncover the extent to which sex differences in wage expectations represent psychological 
systematic bias, the second panel in Figure 1 displays the log predicted market wage for the 
male and female samples. Males have higher wage expectations but also have  higher 
predicted market wages, suggesting that higher male wage expectations are to some extent 
justified. The difference in the predicted market wage distributions between genders is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. To formally test Hypothesis 1, and to analyse the 
extent to which females and males underestimate/overestimate their labour market prospects, 
Figure 2 displays the distribution of male and female optimism, ݈݋݃ሺܧሻ௜௧௎ െ ݈݋݃ሺݕොሻ௜௧௎ .  A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is conducted to test for the equality of the distributions between 
genders, confirming the difference at the 1% level of statistical significance.  The mean of the 
male optimism distribution suggests that on average males overestimate their labour market 
prospect by approximately 3.7%, whilst females on average tend to underestimate their 
labour market prospects by approximately 1.3%.  It is also possible to look at the degree of 
optimism for males and females at different quintiles of the predicted market wage 
distribution. Briefly, females are the most pessimistic at the higher end of the predicted 
market wage distribution which is consistent with the well documented glass ceiling. Here 
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females on average tend to underestimate their prospects by approximately 6.1%. Importantly 
in all quintiles of the predicted market wage distribution males are more optimistic than 
females. For instance in the 3rd quintile of the predicted market wage distribution, males on 
average overestimate their prospects by approximately 4.8% and females underestimate their 
prospects by approximately 5.2%. Whilst the size of miscalibration suggests that on average 
both groups are qualitatively rational, the real interest is in the relative differences in 
optimism between females and males.  These findings overall are consistent with theories 
from evolutionary psychology and provide support for Hypothesis 1, in that females have on 
average less optimistic wage expectations than men. Importantly,   both sexes display 
inaccuracies in estimating their earnings power, but in different directions. Lower female 
expectations therefore appear to be an amalgam of heterogeneous labour market prospects 
and psychological systematic bias. Lastly, it is important to note that this approach is likely to 
underestimate the gender difference in optimism if wage expectations are derived more 
broadly across sex rather than within sex.3  
 
4. Econometric strategy 
For completeness the econometric strategy that follows is concerned with estimating both 
Equations (1) and (2) from Section 2. Equation (1) is estimated as previous studies in 
constructing earning expectations have tended to use the predicted values from a Mincer 
equation, as reliable information on actual recorded expectations is rarely collected (Clark, 
                                                            
3 The current sample comprises of both the economically inactive and the unemployed which are two groups 
fundamentally different in terms of their labour market experiences. From separate analysis of these two groups, 
both male overestimation and female underestimation is observable. This general finding is also consistent 
across those individuals with and without a university degree. The only exception is with gender differences in 
optimism for those individuals who are in full-time education. For this group both males and females tend to 
overestimate their prospects, but consistently men overestimate theirs by more than women. It is important to 
note that those in full-time education tend to be younger and have little prior labour market experience. This 
group has also aged out of period which has seen an improved position for females in the labour force relative to 
earlier cohorts. This, coupled with the lack of labour market experience may explain these higher female 
expectations; after all, optimism is greatest when the chances of success are the most uncertain (Kahneman et 
al., 1982).   
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1997). In this view, wage expectations are therefore assumed to be fully rational, in that, 
individuals compute their expectations by observing the labour market rewards of other 
people like themselves. To reiterate, rational expectations are not the focus of this paper.  
 
4.1 Constructing optimism 
To test Equations (1) and (2), the first-stage of the empirical investigation is to construct the 
formal measures of wage expectations and optimism to be used in the second-stage job 
satisfaction equations. We construct these measures for our sample of unemployed and 
economically inactive individuals, ܷ, net of the environmental influences that cannot be 
directly controlled for in the subsequent second-stage employee job satisfaction equations. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the key variables used to construct the formal 
measures of wage expectations and optimism for the second-stage models, and the sources of 
heterogeneity that exists within the sample. From Table 1, approximately 39% of the sample 
is classified as unemployed, major inactive groups include those in full-time education 
(20.7%) and those in family care (26.6%).  Approximately 6.3% of the sample has a 
university degree, with 25.7% having no formal qualifications. 
 
1. To construct our measure of wage expectations the panel feature of the data is 
exploited. Specifically, a linear fixed-effects regression is estimated of the form 
presented in Equation (4), where ܧ௜௧௎ is the wage expectation of individual ݅ at time ݐ.  
௜ܺ௧	is a vector of time-varying control variables which determine	ܧ௜௧௎,  ݑ௜ଵ is the 
individual fixed-effect and ߝ௜௧ is the usual  random error term.4  The formal measure 
of wage expectations are the individual standardised fixed-effect coefficients 
extracted from Equation (4), ݑො௜ଵ,	which provides an individually-varying measure of 
                                                            
4 X includes all the variables listed in Column (1) of Table 2, and a set of regional and year controls.   
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wage expectations, averaged over a number of periods and excluding the marginal 
impact of time-varying environmental influences. Column (1) of Table 2 reports the 
results from this procedure.   
 
log	ሺܧሻ௜௧௎ ൌ ߚ′ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ݑ௜ଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧  (4) 
 
2. Optimists have a generalised tendency to overestimate the likelihood of positive 
outcomes, which implies a tendency for optimists to have an upwardly biased 
perception of the labour market returns distribution when evaluating their labour 
market prospects. Following Puri and Robinson (2007) and Dawson et al. (2014), 
optimism is measured as the difference between the individual’s wage expectation, 
ܧ௜௧௎, and the predicted market wage, ݕො௜௧௎, estimated via a linear fixed-effects 
regression. The procedure is formally presented in   Equation (5). To recap, the 
predicted market wage is the fitted values from separate gender earnings equations, 
and is therefore based upon the average income of people with the same individual 
characteristics as the respondent. Computing the predicted market wage from separate 
gender earnings equations controls for the issue of same-sex social comparisons and 
hence that men and women may be rewarded differently in the labour market for their 
individual specific characteristics. ௜ܺ௧	as in Equation (4) is a vector of time-varying 
control variables that influence	ܧ௜௧௎, 	ݑ௜ଶ is the individual fixed-effect and ߝ௜௧ is a 
random error term. 
 
log	ሺܧሻ௜௧௎ ൌ ߜlog	ሺݕොሻ௜௧௎ ൅ ߚ′ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ݑ௜ଶ ൅ ߝ௜௧			  (5)5 
 
                                                            
5 For Equations (4) and (5) the Hausman test rejects random-effects in favour of fixed-effects, the random-
effects estimates are therefore inconsistent whilst the fixed-effects estimates are consistent but inefficient.   
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Optimists have higher wage expectations than they should; therefore, conditional on 
the predicted market wage control, optimists will have a correspondingly higher 
fixed-effect. The individual fixed-effect extracted from Equation (5), ݑො௜ଶ, therefore 
provides estimates of optimism, averaged over a number of periods and net of any 
environmental influences.6 Column (2) of Table 2 reports the results from Equation 
(5). Briefly, expectations are qualitatively rational in the sense that those with the 
highest rational expectations are more likely to expect higher wages. Also, age is 
inversely related to optimism as is education. 
  
                                                            
6 One possible argument is that the predicted market wage may give biased estimates of the likely distribution of 
wages facing the sample of unemployed or economically inactive individuals. For instance, the sample of 
individuals who have one or less than one year of current job tenure will include people who were never 
unemployed and have simply moved from one job to another. In this instance the predicted wage will be 
upwardly biased. However the real interest is in relative optimism and a general bias in the predicted market 
wage does not affect this property.  
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4.2 Optimism and job satisfaction 
In the second-stage of this empirical investigation, job satisfaction equations are estimated 
separately for males and females who are currently in paid-employment and who were 
previously unemployed or economically inactive when their wage expectations and optimism 
were constructed. Responses for job satisfaction questions within the BHPS are given on a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from ‘not satisfied at all’ to ‘completely satisfied’. The BHPS 
contains detailed information on job satisfaction, where respondents are asked to rate their 
job satisfaction on 5 items: (1) overall job satisfaction, (2) satisfaction with pay, (3) 
satisfaction with job security, (4) satisfaction with hours worked and lastly, (5) satisfaction 
with the work itself. The primary interest is the effect of optimism on the dimension of job 
satisfaction associated with pay. Also of interest is the extent to which wage expectations and 
optimism affect more general worker well-being; overall job satisfaction is therefore also 
included alongside satisfaction with pay as an outcome variable of interest. Formal tests of 
the relationship between wage expectations, optimism and job satisfaction presented in 
Equations (1) and (2) of Section 2, are described in the second-stage regression presented in 
Equation (6): 
 
ܬ ௜ܵ௧௝ ൌ ߮ݑො௜௡ ൅ ߪlog	ሺݕሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚ′ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (6) 
 
where ܬ ௜ܵ௧௝ 	is job satisfaction for individual ݅ at time ݐ for job satisfaction measure	݆. ௜ܺ௧	is a 
vector of time-varying and time-invariant individual and job-specific characteristics and ݕ௜௧ is 
the individuals achieved net hourly wage in log form.7 ݑො௜௡	are the standardised fixed-effect 
coefficients extracted from either Equation (4) or (5) which provides individual varying 
measures of earnings expectations and optimism,  and ߝ௜௧ is a random error term. It could be 
                                                            
7 See Table 3 for the complete set of controls in the models.  
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argued that under rational expectations, ݑො௜ଶ	is simply capturing unobserved private 
information about earnings power. Prior optimism will therefore be positively correlated with 
subsequent employment earnings in Equation (6). Given rational expectations it follows that 
conditional on current earnings in paid-employment, ߮	is zero.   
 
5. Results 
This section reports formal multivariate regression analysis of the relationship between job 
satisfaction, prior wage expectations and prior optimism for the male, female and pooled 
samples of employees. The ordered dependent variables are treated as cardinal and Equation 
(6) is estimated as a linear regression estimated by OLS, with the standard errors 
bootstrapped and clustered to account for intra-group correlations.8 This modelling strategy 
was chosen in order to perform the detailed linear decomposition in the next section. It should 
be noted though that all results are qualitatively similar to those obtained from non-linear 
ordered response models. Column (1) of Table 3 summarizes the means of the key variables 
of interest used in Equation (6) for the female and male sub-samples. Consistent with other 
studies (e.g. Clark, 1997) females have higher overall job satisfaction and satisfaction with 
pay despite having lower net wages. In particular, female employees have approximately a 
6% and 4% higher mean level of overall job satisfaction and pay satisfaction than male 
employees, respectively. Lending further support to Hypothesis 1, net of any environmental 
influences females have both lower expected wages (ݑො௜ଵ) and lower optimism (ݑො௜ଶ)   than men. 
T-tests are performed in both instances for the difference in means between genders, 
confirming the differences at the 1% level of statistical significance. 
 
                                                            
8 For robustness, Equation (6) is also estimated using a linear correlated random effects model in order to 
account for other sources of time invariant individual heterogeneity. The results are wholly consistent with those 
presented in Table 3.  
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Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 report the empirical results from the multivariate regression 
analysis for the male, female and pooled samples that lends support to Hypothesis 2. In the 
pooled models the female coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or 
better. For pay satisfaction, the wage expectation and optimism coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for the pooled, female and male samples. These effects 
are not small. A one standard deviation increase in optimism from the mean reduces female 
satisfaction with pay, all other things equal, from 4.82 to 4.67. The size of this effect is 
equivalent to increasing females usual working hour’s week, all other things constant, from 
25 to 35 hours. At the extremes, the most optimistic of female employees (+2.5 standard 
deviations from the mean) have a satisfaction with pay score some 14% less than the least 
optimistic (-2.5 standard deviations from the mean). For males the corresponding effect is 
smaller at approximately 10%. Higher expected wages and optimism also reduce overall job 
satisfaction for men and for women. However, the coefficients in the female models are much 
smaller than those in the male models and are not statistically significant at the conventional 
levels. Current earnings increase overall job satisfaction but the relationship for females is not 
statistically significant, providing further support to the idea that women put less emphasis on 
the importance of earnings, and instead, value other non-pecuniary aspects of employment 
(Jackson et al., 1992; Hundley, 2001). As with other studies, education (Clark and Oswald, 
1996) and being a member of a trade union (Clark, 1997; Bender and Sloane, 1998) reduces 
job satisfaction. In the case of education, Clark and Oswald (1996) suggest the relationship is 
due to education raising ambition targets.  
 
5.1 Decomposing the gender job satisfaction gap  
In order to test Hypothesis 3 and to provide further understanding of the job satisfaction 
differences between male and female employees and investigate the relative contributions of 
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the key regression model covariates, this section undertakes a linear decomposition analysis. 
When outcomes of interest are continuous and modelled using linear regression (e.g. wages) 
the Blinder-Oaxaca (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) decomposition technique has been widely 
used. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for the female/male gap in the average value of job 
satisfaction,	ܬܵ, can be expressed as:  
 
ܬഥܵ ி െ ܬഥܵ ெ ൌ ሺ തܺி െ തܺெሻߚመ∗ ൅ തܺி൫ߚመி െ ߚመ∗൯ ൅ തܺெ൫ߚመ∗ െ ߚመெ൯ (7) 
 
where ܬഥܵ ி െ ܬഥܵ ெ is the difference between the average outcome of the female and the male 
sample.   തܺ௚ is a row vector of average values of the independent variables and ߚመ௚	is a vector 
of coefficient estimates for gender ݃ ൌ ሺܨ,ܯሻ. The asterisk refers to the coefficients 
estimated from a model where the samples are pooled together. The difference in the 
outcome due to characteristics/endowments (the “explained” part) is captured by the first 
term on the right-hand side of Equation (7), while the second and third terms shows the 
differential that is due to differences in the estimated coefficients (the “unexplained” part). 
The specific formulation of the decomposition analysis used in this analysis uses the 
coefficients from a pooled model for the estimation of the explained part. However, Equation 
(7) can be formulated accordingly based on the specific model coefficients (pooled, female or 
male) that are used for calculating the explained part of the gap.9 
 
Table 4 provides the results of this decomposition analysis for both the explained and 
unexplained components of the job satisfaction gap between female and male employees. 
                                                            
9 See Jann (2008) for the different formulas in each case and the details on the Stata routine used to estimate the 
decomposition. While the appropriate method for decomposing ordered response outcomes would be to use non-
linear decomposition techniques (Bauer and Sinning, 2008) the detailed decomposition (which estimates the 
separate contribution of each independent variable) is only available in the case of binary responses (Fairlie, 
2005).  
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Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered to account for intra-group correlations. Model 
(1) provides estimate’s when expected wages are included as a covariate and alternatively 
Model (2) when optimism is included. For brevity, only contributions of the key variables of 
interest are included. The upper panel of Table 4 shows the mean job satisfaction scores for 
the male and female samples. The differences in these average scores are then produced; this 
is further broken down into a contribution explained by differences in characteristics and the 
contribution to differences in estimated coefficients.  For example, from Model (1) the gender 
gap in overall job satisfaction is 0.287; of this gap 57% can be explained by differences in the 
characteristics distribution, with the remaining difference of 43% being due to the differences 
between the coefficients. Panel A of Table 4 shows the breakdown of characteristics whereas 
Panel B shows the breakdown for the estimated coefficients.  
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In Panel A, a positive (negative) coefficient reflects a more favourable average endowment of 
females (males) and as such contributes to an increasing (decreasing) job satisfaction gap. For 
ease of interpretation the coefficients are expressed as contributions of the overall gender 
difference in job satisfaction in percentage terms. Starting with Model (1) and overall job 
satisfaction, 43% of the differential remains unexplained. Lower average female wage 
expectations explain approximately 9.82% of the overall gender difference in overall job 
satisfaction. For Model (1) and pay satisfaction the raw gender gap is 0.173, of this 
differential 86% remains unexplained. Of the explained component, lower average female 
wage expectations are again an important contributing factor, explaining 27.30% of the 
overall difference in job satisfaction associated with pay. The results from Model (2) are 
largely consistent with Model (1). Of the explained components, lower female average 
optimism has a relatively large contributing factor to gender differentials in both overall job 
satisfaction and pay satisfaction, explaining 6.75% and 18.58% of the differentials, 
respectively. The difference in the contributions from wage expectations and optimism within 
Models (1) and (2) may be that bad job market matches are not randomly distributed across 
gender or that wage expectations are derived more broadly by individuals  across sex, which 
implies that ݑො௜ଶ is likely to underestimate the gender differences in optimism.  These results 
provide strong support for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, such that, job satisfaction from 
paid employment depends upon our prior expectations. Importantly, lower and ultimately 
more pessimistic female wage expectations contribute significantly in explaining the paradox 
of the contented female worker.   
 
Briefly Panel B of Table 4 reports the unexplained components of the job satisfaction 
differentials, as with Panel A a positive (negative) coefficient reflects a stronger, positive 
association of the estimated coefficient for females (males) and as such contributes to an 
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increasing (decreasing) job satisfaction gap. For satisfaction with pay 86% and 95% of the 
raw gender differential remains unexplained for Models (1) and (2), respectively. There exists 
no significant difference between gender in the strength of the association between the key 
covariates and the job satisfaction measures.10   
 
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis  
Optimism measured as ݑො௜ଶ from Equation (5) allows us to capture an individual’s underlying 
tendency to overestimate their labour market prospects net of any time-varying 
environmental influences.   A possible objection to this construction of optimism is that by 
removing the sources of time-varying observable individual heterogeneity, important 
information on optimism is lost.  For instance, optimists may spend longer in unemployment 
as optimism may increase the threshold for acceptable employment or optimism may lower 
job-search intensity (Spinnewijn, 2015). In controlling for unemployment duration in 
Equation (5), this potentially useful information is excluded. For this reason, the above 
analyses are repeated, where wage expectations are simply the raw measure of wage 
expectations, ݈݋݃ሺܧሻ௜௧௎ , and optimism is the raw difference between the individuals expected 
wage and the predicted market wage, ݈݋݃ሺܧሻ௜௧௎ െ ݈݋݃ሺݕොሻ௜௧௎ . No substantial differences from 
this procedure were identified. The correlations between the raw measures and the fixed-
effects measures of wage expectations and optimism are high, with a correlation of 0.849 and 
0.794, respectively.  
                                                            
10 Of the unexplained components the two most important contributing factors to the female job satisfaction 
advantage are home ownership and the number of dependent children. Both of these factors attract a sizeable 
positive coefficient, illustrating that for females these factors have a more positive effect on job satisfaction than 
for men. Importantly though, the female job satisfaction advantage would be even larger if females reacted to 
wages and working hours like men. Current earnings attract a large negative coefficient, illustrative of the lower 
valuation females place on earnings. Hours of work attracts a negative and statistically significant coefficient, 
illustrating that for female’s hours of work has a stronger negative effect on job satisfaction than for males. 
Estimates of the separate contribution of variables to the unexplained component of the decomposition are 
though subject to the identification problem identified by Jones (1983). The real interest here though is in the 
contribution of gender differences in the endowment of characteristics.  
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A further area of interest is the extent to which the results are consistent across our 
economically inactive and unemployed samples, two groups fundamentally different in terms 
of their labour market attachment and experiences. To test this proposition, the analyses are 
repeated separately for three mutually exclusive groups; 1) the unemployed, 2) the 
economically inactive and, 3) those in full-time education. For the unemployed sample, the 
results are wholly consistent with the main results presented above. Specifically, males have 
a tendency to overestimate their labour market prospects and women have a tendency to 
underestimate theirs. Gender differences in wage expectations and optimism explains 
approximately 41.8% and 22.1% of the female job satisfaction with pay advantage, 
respectively. For the economically inactive group (excluding those in full-time education), 
female pessimism and male optimism is present. Whilst females in this sample have a 
sizeable job satisfaction advantage when employed, this gap is not explained by gender 
differences in optimism or wage expectations. The majority of the economically inactive are 
engaged in family care, 76% are female, 4% have a university degree and have on average 
been economically inactive for approximately 6 years. This group are therefore relatively 
detached from the labour market and are likely to have heterogeneous preferences on the rank 
and importance placed upon an array of job-specific outcomes. Given the demographic of this 
sample, this group may tend to put a smaller emphasis on the importance of earnings and 
instead value other aspects such as flexibility and working hours. For those in full-time 
education, who tend to be younger and have little labour market experience, both males and 
female tend to overestimate their labour market prospects, but consistently men are more 
optimistic than women. For this group there is also no discernable female job satisfaction 
advantage. This is consistent with Clark (1997) who first argued that the paradox of the 
contented female worker resulted from a lag in adjustment between female expectations and 
improved female labour market prospects. However, for younger and more educated workers, 
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Clark (1997) found no evidence of a satisfaction gap, which he proposed was due to 
expectations being closer to reality for this group. Furthermore, Green et al. (2016) provide 
evidence of a declining female job satisfaction advantage in the UK which can be explained 
by the increasingly harsh evaluation of job characteristics by women.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Prior research suggests that whilst pay can motivate workers in itself, perceptions and 
expectations of pay are also likely to impact many important aspects of labour market 
behaviour. This paper tests the hypothesis that job satisfaction from paid-employment 
depends on labour market performance relative to performance expectations, and more 
specifically, whether gender heterogeneity in optimism helps to explain the paradox of the 
contented female worker. Previous studies (e.g. Clark, 1997) have analysed the relationship 
between expectations and job satisfaction before within labour market frameworks, but owing 
to the lack of data collected on wage expectations, empirical analysis has tended to be 
constrained to computing predictions of individual expectations based upon the ideas of 
labour market rationality. This paper uses data on actual recorded wage expectations from a 
large UK panel, for individuals prior to entry into the labour market. Three key findings are 
produced. First, wage expectations tend to be a good predictor of the distribution of market 
wages offered. Whilst females have lower earnings expectations than men, these lower 
expectations are in part justified, reflecting heterogeneous labour market prospects.  Second, 
consistent with evolutionary psychology, the results strongly suggest that men are more 
optimistic than women in assessing their labour market prospects. Both sexes display some 
inaccuracies in estimating their earnings power, but in different directions. Lower female 
expectations therefore appear to be an amalgam of heterogeneous labour market prospects 
and psychological systematic bias. Third, evidence is provided in support of theories of self-
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discrepancy from social psychology, in that, conditional on actual performance, optimism is 
negatively related to subsequent employment satisfaction through a disappointment effect. In 
this respect, male optimism and female pessimism appears to explain a significant proportion 
of the paradox of the contented female worker, especially in terms of the satisfaction derived 
from pay.  Prior research has highlighted the implications of job satisfaction on important 
aspects of labour market behaviours, such as quitting intentions, absenteeism and 
productivity. Consequently, policies designed at dampening expectations may lead to 
happier, more productive employees. In particular, the fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof 
and Yellen, 1990) states workers withdraw effort as their actual labour market earnings fall 
short of what is deemed fair, optimism is likely to influence perceptions of fairness, and is 
therefore likely to exaggerate these adverse effects.   
 
Whilst this paper points to the advantages of pessimism in the labour market, there is a 
downside. Specifically, the finding that pessimistic female expectations (optimistic male 
expectations) contribute significantly to the paradox of the contended female worker is of 
concern for researchers attempting to uncover ways to reduce the gender pay gap.  Workers 
will change jobs or negotiate better conditions when they feel that some aspects of their 
current job can be improved upon (Delfgaauw, 2007). If women remain satisfied with such 
pay inequality, they are less likely to negotiate or to search for positions with higher salaries. 
Consider a further related application of optimism to job search theory, where individuals exit 
unemployment once a sufficiently good prospect has been offered. It follows that optimism 
increases the threshold for acceptable employment, raising unemployment duration and 
starting salaries. Consistent with this view, Brown and Taylor (2011) report that individuals 
with a reservation wage which is below the corresponding wages prevailing in the labour 
market, increases the probability of future employment. Pessimism is therefore associated 
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with higher disutility from unemployment and lower marginal utility from extra income. 
Once a sufficiently good employment prospect has been identified and secured, optimism 
may have further effects. For instance Babcock et al. (2003) find that 57% of men attempted 
to negotiate their initial compensation offer compared to only 7% of females, which may be 
because women feel relatively less deserving (Major, 1987). Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) 
find that top performing women are significantly less likely to choose tournament 
compensation than low performing men, with the difference being primarily attributable to 
male overconfidence. When information about productivity is noisy and employers are less 
informed, optimism may increase earnings. As Trivers (2000) points out, optimism may have 
evolved to sway others. To convince others of your competence you really need to believe it 
yourself. Furthermore, whilst it is generally recognised by economists that overly optimistic 
beliefs lead to distorted decision making, there is now considerable evidence that such beliefs 
can increase performance (see Compte and Postlewaite, 2004). Optimism can have such 
advantages as increasing motivation and strengthening one’s ability to cope with negative 
feedback and stressful events (see Taylor and Brown, 1988). In short, this suggests that the 
gender-earnings differential may reflect supply-side issues based on personality. Future 
research should apply these findings to gender differences in contract choice, occupational 
choice and more broadly the gender pay gap.   
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimation of log expected wage (࢒࢕ࢍሺࡱሻ࢏࢚ࢁ) and log predicted 
market wage ሺ࢒࢕ࢍሺ࢟ෝሻ࢏࢚ࢁሻ. 
 
  
 
Figure 2: Kernel density estimation of the miscalibration between the log expected wage 
and the log predicted market wage, ࢒࢕ࢍሺࡱሻ࢏࢚ࢁ െ ࢒࢕ࢍሺ࢟ෝሻ࢏࢚ࢁ . 
0
.5
1
1.
5
de
ns
ity
.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Log Expected Wage
Female Log Expected Wage
Male Log Expected Wage
0
.5
1
1.
5
de
ns
ity
.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Log Predicted Market Wage
Female Log Predicted Market Wage
Male Log Predicted Market Wage
34 
 
  
 
   
0
.5
1
1.
5
de
ns
ity
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Optimism
Female Optimism
Male Optimism
35 
 
TABLE 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log Net Expected Wage, logሺܧሻ௜௧௎  1.459 0.464 -2.539 6.109 
Log Net Predicted Market Wage, logሺݕොሻ௜௧௎  1.448 0.324 0.535 2.652 
Demographic Factors (reference: age 16-24):     
Age 25-34 0.222  0 1 
Age 35-44 0.157  0 1 
Age 45-54 0.137  0 1 
Age 55-64 0.098  0 1 
Highest educational attainment (reference: no 
qualifications):     
University (Degree) 0.063  0 1 
Further education 0.148  0 1 
A-level 0.153  0 1 
O-levels/GCSEs 0.249  0 1 
Other qualifications 0.130  0 1 
Household Structure (reference: not married)     
Married 0.506  0 1 
Number of children in household  0.718 1.093 0 9 
Household size 3.433 1.526 1 16 
Health:     
Mental health problem 0.091  0 1 
Physical health problem 0.510  0 1 
Inactivity category (reference: unemployed):     
Family care 0.266  0 1 
Full-time students 0.207  0 1 
Long-term sick/disabled 0.078  0 1 
Other category (retired, maternity leave and 
government training scheme)  0.056 0 1 
Years in current labour market status  4.369 5.815 0 39 
Years in current labour market status squared 52.906 123.965 0 1521 
Log household labour income 1.817 6.725 -6.908 10.087 
Log household investment income -1.859 5.193 -6.908 7.994 
Log household benefit income 3.652 4.724 -6.908 8.509 
Log monthly rent or mortgage cost repayment 1.283 5.471 -6.908 8.613 
Observations 7,298 (4,077 individuals) 
 
Notes: Individuals who recorded zero household labour income; zero household investment 
income; zero household benefit income or zero monthly rent or mortgage cost repayment 
were inputted values of 0.001 prior to the conversion of these variables into log form.  
 
 
TABLE 2: Linear Fixed Effects Regression Coefficients from Wage Expectation 
Equations 
 (1) Equation 4 (2) Equation 5 
 Log Net Expected 
Wage, logሺܧሻ௜௧௎  
Log Net Expected 
Wage, logሺܧሻ௜௧௎  
 Coef. Coef. 
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Log Net Predicted Market Wage, logሺݕොሻ௜௧௎  - 0.548*** 
Demographic Factors (reference: age 16-24):   
Age 25-34 -0.014 -0.059* 
Age 35-44 -0.078 -0.143*** 
Age 45-54 -0.211*** -0.246*** 
Age 55-64 -0.291*** -0.256*** 
Highest educational attainment (reference: no 
qualifications):   
University (Degree) 0.231*** -0.112 
Further education 0.091 -0.084 
A-level 0.058 -0.114 
O-levels/GCSEs 0.032 -0.060 
Other qualifications 0.106 0.064 
Household Structure (reference: not married)   
Married -0.004 -0.040 
Number of children in household  0.039*** 0.025* 
Household size -0.008 -0.006 
Health:   
Mental health problem 0.016 0.054** 
Physical health problem 0.010 0.025 
Inactivity category (reference: unemployed):   
Family care -0.020 -0.018 
Full-time students -0.064* -0.052 
Long-term sick/disabled 0.054 0.051 
Other category (retired, maternity leave and 
government training scheme) -0.030 -0.018 
Years in current labour market status  0.001 0.002 
Years in current labour market status squared 0.000 0.000 
Log household labour income -0.002 -0.002 
Log household investment income -0.002 -0.002 
Log household benefit income 0.002 0.002 
Log monthly rent or mortgage cost repayment 0.000 0.000 
Observations 7,298 (4,077 
individuals) 
7,298 (4,077 
individuals) 
F-test  11.44*** 12.19*** 
Notes: All models are bootstrapped and clustered by individual and also include controls for 
region and survey year. * Coefficient significant at 0.10, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.01. 
 
 
TABLE 3: Means and OLS Regression Coefficients from Job Satisfaction/Pay 
Satisfaction Equations 
  Overall Job Satisfaction Pay Satisfaction 
Means Pooled 
Coef. 
Male 
Coef. 
Female 
Coef. 
Pooled 
Coef. 
Male 
Coef. 
Female 
Coef. 
Male Female       
Dependent Variables:         
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Overall job 
satisfaction 
5.196 5.484**
* 
      
Pay satisfaction 4.657 4.830**
* 
      
Model 1         
Female   0.123**   0.149**   
  (0.051)   (0.064)   
Standardised Expected 
Wage, ݑො௜ଵ 
0.213 -
0.142**
* 
-
0.079**
* 
-
0.131**
* 
-0.036 -
0.133**
* 
-
0.112**
* 
-
0.171**
* 
  (0.025) (0.033) (0.038) (0.032) (0.038) (0.051)
Full control variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   10239 4762 5477 10239 4762 5477 
F-Test   7.38*** 5.20*** 4.92*** 8.75*** 5.96*** 5.86***
ܴ²   0.1006 0.1222 0.1051 0.1210 0.1626 0.1260 
Model 2         
Female   0.132**
* 
  0.165**
* 
  
  (0.051)   (0.064)   
Standardised 
Optimism, ݑො௜ଶ 
0.191 -
0.090**
* 
-
0.069**
* 
-
0.121**
* 
-0.027 -
0.115**
* 
-
0.103**
* 
-
0.148**
* 
  (0.022) (0.029) (0.034) (0.028) (0.034) (0.045)
Age 35.265 36.869 0.007**
* 
0.009**
* 
0.005* 0.003 0.004 0.003 
White 0.951 0.953 0.043 -0.042 0.144 0.256** 0.206 0.330**
Number of cigarettes 
per day 
5.887 4.886 -0.002 0.002 -
0.009**
-
0.006** 
-0.001 -
0.012**
* 
Household structure (reference: single, never married)     
Married or cohabiting 0.638 0.674 0.077 0.099 -0.034 -0.049 -0.145 0.013 
Widowed, divorced or 
separated 
0.057 0.134 -0.026 0.058 -0.114 -0.173 -0.121 -0.174 
Spouse/partner 
employed 
0.477 0.614 -0.075 -0.131* -0.007 0.085 0.030 0.108 
Household size 3.039 3.301 0.036** 0.050** 0.032 0.020 0.020 0.026 
Number of children  0.577 0.907 -0.006 -
0.076**
0.009 -0.034 -0.090* -0.023 
Mental health problem 0.026 0.080 -
0.259**
* 
-
0.403**
-
0.167**
-0.033 -0.005 0.007 
Physical health 
problem 
0.437 0.517 -
0.076**
-0.088 -0.059 -0.008 0.067 -0.061 
Highest education attainment (reference: no 
qualifications) 
     
University (Degree) 0.220 0.185 -
0.555**
-
0.422**
-
0.643**
-
0.539**
-
0.523**
-
0.541**
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* * * * * * 
Further education 0.317 0.319 -
0.401**
* 
-
0.432**
* 
-
0.353**
* 
-
0.388**
* 
-
0.502**
* 
-0.276*
A-Levels 0.156 0.115 -
0.329**
* 
-
0.231**
-
0.375**
* 
-
0.348**
* 
-
0.274**
-
0.375**
O-Levels/GCSE’s 0.138 0.202 -0.129 -0.024 -0.185* -0.157 -0.038 -0.211 
Other qualifications 0.073 0.088 -
0.204**
-0.222* -0.214* -0.163 -0.252 -0.103 
Labour market characteristics:   
Weekly usual hours 38.566 27.242 -
0.011**
* 
-0.004 -
0.012**
* 
-
0.010**
* 
0.000 -
0.014**
* 
Paid overtime hours 2.788 1.397 0.002 0.009** -0.006 0.019**
* 
0.027**
* 
0.011 
Unpaid overtime hours 1.695 1.277 -0.001 0.006 -
0.014**
-
0.016**
* 
-0.002 -
0.032**
* 
Manager/foreman/supe
rvisor 
0.324 0.241 0.028 0.017 0.04 0.088* 0.039 0.137* 
Holding second job 0.075 0.090 -0.101* -0.054 -0.114* -0.076 -0.206* 0.034 
Tenure in years 2.139 2.308 -
0.016**
-0.013 -
0.023**
-0.012 -
0.025**
-0.006 
Shift work 0.081 0.049 -0.135* -0.12 -0.163 -0.009 0.07 -0.074 
Fixed-term contract 0.043 0.033 0.029 0.087 -0.014 0.087 0.204 -0.043 
Casual/seasonal/agenc
y worker 
0.039 0.046 -
0.224**
* 
-
0.292**
* 
-0.135 0.147* 0.108 0.191* 
Promotion 
opportunities 
0.506 0.443 0.391**
* 
0.460**
* 
0.327**
* 
0.241**
* 
0.264**
* 
0.195**
* 
Pay includes bonus or 
profit share 
0.352 0.220 0.048 0.057 0.031 0.084* 0.088 0.063 
Member of employer 
pension scheme 
0.361 0.381 0.061 0.106 0.018 0.040 0.140* -0.06 
Pay includes annual 
increments 
0.393 0.462 0.177**
* 
0.133**
* 
0.209**
* 
0.183**
* 
0.097* 0.267**
* 
Trade union status (reference: not 
covered) 
      
Covered non-member 0.182 0.235 -
0.124**
* 
-
0.148**
-0.083 0.086 0.002 0.167* 
Covered member 0.159 0.215 -
0.206**
* 
-0.118 -
0.188**
-0.130* -0.101 -0.066 
Log hourly net wage 1.751 1.646 0.185**
* 
0.363**
* 
0.034 1.115**
* 
1.317**
* 
0.953**
* 
Observations 4,762 5,477 10,239 4,762 5,477 10,239 4,762 5,477 
F-Test   7.38*** 5.21*** 4.92*** 8.73*** 5.96*** 5.84***
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ܴ²   0.1005 0.1224 0.1050 0.1206 0.1626 0.1256 
Notes: Bootstrapped and clustered standard errors in parenthesis for key coefficients. All 
models include  controls for: age, ethnicity, highest educational attainment, marital status, 
whether spouse/partner employed,  number of children in household, household size, housing 
tenure, physical and mental health condition, number of cigarettes smoked per day, 
workplace covered by a trade union, member of a trade union,  normal and overtime hours, 
managerial status, holding a second job, job tenure in years, fixed-term or permanent 
contract, promotion opportunities in main job, pay includes a bonus or profit share incentive, 
member of employer’s pension scheme, pay includes annual yearly increments, work 
location, past wage in previous employment (which is set to zero if there is no previous job), 
shift work, occupation category, sector of employment, industry, workplace size, and a set of 
regional and year controls. * Coefficient significant at 0.10, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.01. 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Oaxaca Decomposition of Mean Differences in Overall Job Satisfaction/Pay 
Satisfaction between Female and Males Employees 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Pay 
Satisfaction 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Pay 
Satisfaction 
Mean score – Females 5.484 4.830 5.484 4.830 
Mean score – Males 5.196 4.657 5.196 4.657 
Difference 0.287 0.173 0.287 0.173 
Total explained – 
endowments  
0.165 (57%) 0.025 (14%) 0.155 (54%) 0.008 (5%) 
Total unexplained – 
coefficients  
0.122 (43%) 0.148 (86%) 0.132 (46%) 0.165 (95%) 
PANEL A - Contribution 
from mean differences in 
selected characteristics: 
       
Standardized Expected 
Wage,	ݑො௜ଵ   
0.028*** 0.047*** - - 
(Standard error) (0.009) (0.014) - - 
% of difference explained 9.82% 27.30% - - 
Standardized Optimism, ݑො௜ଶ - - 0.019*** 0.032*** 
(Standard error) - - (0.009) (0.010) 
% of difference explained - - 6.75% 18.58% 
PANEL B - Contribution 
from mean differences in 
selected coefficients: 
    
Standardized Expected 
Wage,	ݑො௜ଵ   0.005 0.001 - - 
(Standard error) (0.004) (0.004) - - 
% of difference explained 1.71% 0.53% - - 
Standardized Optimism, ݑො௜ଶ - - (0.006) (0.001) 
(Standard error) - - (0.004) (0.004) 
% of difference explained - - 2.12% 0.36% 
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Observations 10,239  
Note: All models are bootstrapped and clustered by individual and include the complete set of 
controls listed in Table 3.* Coefficient significant at 0.10, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.01.   
 
 
